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In other states which operate under similar statutes the courts
have not reached the same result. In Massachusetts the Teacher
Tenure Act was held not to limit the power of the school com-
mittee to reduce compensation or to change the duties of teachers.7
This view was followed by an Indiana decision in which the court
pointed out that although a teacher becomes a permanent em-
ployee of the school corporation at the expiration of the proba-
tionary term, the Act does not require that he continue to hold
the same position. Consequently, it was held that a teacher may
be either promoted or demoted at the will of the Board.'
The result reached in California and New York, that a teacher
cannot be reduced in rank, is obviously sound, and the Louisiana
court is to be commended for adopting this position. The evident
purpose of the Act is to give security to those members of the
teaching profession who have proved themselves to be capable.
Hence, the instant opinion holding that the Act guarantees the
same grade or status attained by permanent teachers is eminently
correct.
J.B.D.
WIRE TAPPING-ILLEGALLY ,OBTAINED EVIDENCE-DERIVATIVE USE
-In Nardone v. United States,' decided in 1937, the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Communications Act 2 rendered inad-
missible as evidence any facts gained by the surreptitious inter-
ception of interstate communications (wire tapping). Later these
communications were used to obtain other evidence and the de-
fendant was re-indicted. On certiorari the Supreme Court held
that the statute also prevented the prosecution from making any
derivative use of such evidence. Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 227 (1939).-
7. Boody v. School Committee, 276 Mass. 134, 177 N.E. 78 (1931).
8. School City of Peru v. State, 212 Ind. 255, 7 N.E. (2d) 176 (1937).
1. 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937). In this case the prosecu-
tion contended that the purpose of the Act was to transfer jurisdiction over
radio and wire communications to the newly constituted Federal Communica-
tions Commission, and it was not intended to prohibit wire tapping to obtain
evidence. The Court said that the provision of Section 605 "no person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and di-
vulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effort or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person . operates to render
such evidence inadmissible.
2. 48 Stat. 1064, § 605 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (1939).
3. The Court quoting from Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319, 321 (1920) said: "The essence of a pro-
vision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is not merely
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In Olmstead v. United States4 the Supreme Court held that
wire tapping was not an unreasonable search and seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment5 and it did not constitute
a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination contained
in the Fifth Amendment., Hence, such evidence was admissible
in federal courts even though obtained in violation of state law.7
Six years later the Federal Communications Act was passed. It
contained general language to the effect that no unauthorized
person should intercept or divulge the contents of any communi-
cation.' Acting on this, the Supreme Court, in the instant case,
reached a decision superseding the holding in Olmstead v. United
States. In Weiss v. United States9 the Act was further extended
to cover intrastate communications, 0 thus settling the numerous
conflicting holdings in the lower federal courts.1
In the instant case the court pointed out that the stern en-
forcement of criminal law must be harmonized with the protec-
tion of privacy. Although the language of the Act is very broad
that the evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but it shall
not be used at all." (308 U.S. 338, 340.) However, the Court pointed out that
if knowledge of such facts is gained from an independent source they may
be proved like any others. But the burden is on the defendant to prove that
wire tapping was employed. Once he has established this, the trial judge
must give the defendant an opportunity to prove that a substantial portion of
the case against him was unlawfully procured.
4. 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376 (1928).
5. The Court in this case stated: "The amendment itself shows that the
search is to be of material things, the person, the house, his papers or
offices." (277 U.S. 438, 464.) The Court also emphasized the fact that there
was no trespass.
6. The Court stated that since the obtaining of the evidence did not
violate the Fourth Amendment its introduction did not violate the Fifth
Amendment.
7. The Court in this connection adopted the common law rule that the
admissibility of the evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by
which it was obtained.
8. See note 2, supra.
9. 308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269, 84 L.Ed. 223 (1939). In this case the prosecu-
tion tried to evade the statute by persuading certain of the defendants who
had participated in the telephone conversation to plead guilty and then at
the trial to read a copy of the intercepted messages. The Court held that the
Act applied to intrastate communications and that "the interception and
divulgence were not authorized within the meaning of the act."
10. In Beard v. Sanford, 8 U.S. Law Week 503 (1940), the Supreme Court
held that a defendant who was convicted on evidence obtained by wire
tapping was not entitled to be discharged in a habeas corpus proceeding
although such evidence had been held inadmissible in the Nardone and Weiss
cases. The reason assigned by the Court was that at the time of the trial, the
evidence was considered admissible under the Olmstead case.
11. Cf. Valli v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C.C.A. 1st, 1938); Sablowshy
v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 183 (C.C.A. 3d, 1938). See also United States v.
Bonanzi, 94 F. (2d) 570 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938); Ginsburg v. United States, 96 F.
(2d) 433 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938); United States v. Reed, 96 F. (2d) 785 (C.C.A. 2d,
1938).
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it is not known whether this rule will be limited to evidence in-
tercepted by federal agents or those acting under color of federal
authority, or will be further extended to include messages inter-
cepted by individuals and municipal officers.1
2
H.W.W.
12. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652
(1914), the Court held that protection against individual misconduct of mu-
nicipal police officers not acting under color of federal authority Is not
afforded by the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment. The limitations of this
amendment reach only the federal government and its agents.
